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Abstract
This paper is set to find out whether the competition of Sino-Nationalism will have been influenced by the mutual benefit of their economics
relations rather than by the historical hard-line military power. Post-Cold War era has shifted the ideological issue from capitalism/liberalism versus
socialism/communism model to nation-wide economic welfare competition which made People’s Republic of China (PRC) to redefine their national
entity towards its contending part, the nationalist Republic of China (RoC). While Sino-American relations may have warmed under the Taiwan’s
new administration and the increasing role which Taiwan plays in Mainland China economics may have been well noted, may still lead to an
undesired conflict.
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Abstrak
Tulisan ini dibuat untuk mengetahui apakah persaingan Sino - Nasionalisme akan dipengaruhi oleh hubungan ekonomi saling menguntungkan
daripada sejarah garis kekuatan militer sejarah . Era paska Perang Dingin telah menggeserkan isu ideologis dari kapitalisme / liberalisme melawan
sosialisme / model komunisme menjadi persaingan kesejahteraan ekonomi nasional yang membuat Republik Rakyat Cina (RRC) mendefinisikan ulang
entitas nasional mereka terhadap saingan mereka nasionalis Republik Cina ( RoC ). Sementara itu, hubungan Sino - Amerika menjadi lebih akrab di
bawah administratif baru Taiwan dan meningkatkan peranan Taiwan di daratan utama ekonomi Cina telah dicatat dengan baik, dan akan menuntun
pada konflik yang tidak diinginkan.
Kata kunci : Nasionalisme Cina , Taiwan , ekonomi , militer
INTRODUCTION
Republic of China (RoC or Taiwan) has played a
prominent role in Chinese politics since the founding
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. For
decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) called
for the “liberation” of the island, first as a means to
increase its legitimacy internationally, and more
recently with declining legitimacy of their socialist
foundation, to deflect criticism of continued one-
party rule. When the U.S. granted formal recognition
to the PRC in 1979, the PRC finally dropped the
constant threat of invasion, assuming that without
American support, formal independence would not
occur and Taiwan would inevitably “come back
home.”
So far, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which
followed prevented any short term unification plans.
After the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan fully
democratized, the PRC gravitated towards a hardline
approach, believing that the U.S. encouraged Taiwan-
ese independence and intended to keep Taiwan
separate. While cross-strait relations may have warmed
under the new Prime Minister Ma Ying-jeou adminis-
tration and Sino-American relations beyond the
Taiwan issue have greatly improved in the past decade,
the role which Taiwan plays in Chinese nationalism
may still lead to an undesired conflict.
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The paper will overview of Chinese nationalism
and the role of Taiwan within this narrative. Then to
address how Taiwan’s democratization has created
tensions within this nationalist narrative. In the final
part, while the continued focus on Taiwan prevents a
peaceful solution, military conflict should not be seen
as unavoidable.
ANALYSIS
THE CONCEPT OF NATIONALISM
Scholars and non-academics have struggled to
capture the multiple facets of Chinese nationalism, as
evident in the massive literature on the subject.1
Studies of nationalism attempt to subdivide the
phenomenon by various means, often resulting in
categories which fit only one country.
While this may provide some definitional clarity,
needs to be noted that a focus on state nationalism
which treats the government as the main architect of
Chinese nationalism (in contrast to popular national-
ism) is sufficient in this situation, especially when
concerning the Taiwan issue. State nationalism high-
lights the need for a strong central power, consistent
with the CCP’s desire to justify its continued rule.
Furthermore, there was little sign of an independent
popular nationalism in China before the 1990s and
what does exist today remains largely defined by the
CCP (Chan and Bridges, 2006: 127-156).
Chinese nationalism should be viewed not as a
fixed concept or a historical given, but rather as an
ambiguous tool used for political purposes. Pye states
that “Chinese nationalism is what the leaders of the
day say it is, and this means that it becomes a defense
of their formulations of what the consensus should
be” (Pye, 1992: 232). By doing so, official nationalism
attempts to blur the separation between the nation
and rulers (Anderson, 1983: 110). A similar blurring
of the lines is evident in the PRC’s official account of
Taiwan’s post-war status, which states that the “Chi-
nese people” recovered the lost territory of Taiwan in
1945. No distinction is acknowledged between land
and people nor those under Communist rule and that
under the Nationalists.
Similarly, while defining itself as a multi-ethnic
state, Chinese nationalism remains at its core Han-
centered, leading many to equate present nationalism
with Han chauvinism (Dikotter, 2005: 177-204;
Chow, 2001: 47-84). This conception of Chinese
nationalism, however, remains an admitted simplifica-
tion. While this article starts from a position of elite-
driven nationalism, one must acknowledge that
nationalism in almost any context defies such narrow
instrumental definitions. Societal influences increas-
ingly shape Chinese nationalism, but more in terms of
responding to state-driven directives rather than
presenting an organic alternative. The focal points of
contemporary Chinese nationalism may be dictated by
the leadership, but how these factors resonate with the
general populace largely defines the depth of such
sentiments, creating restraints beyond what elites may
have originally intended.
New regimes often push nationalism to overcome
perceived historical wrongs subjected to by other
powers. Mondal described Indian nationalism simi-
larly as ideologically a pole away from colonialism
(Mondal, 2003: 144).  Although only small parts of
China were de facto colonized by Western powers
(i.e., Hong Kong and Macao), China’s history with
Western imperialism (and later Japanese imperialism)
has a similar influence on Chinese nationalism,
leading some to state that anti-imperialism defines
Chinese nationalism.2 The success of the CCP trans-
formed Chinese nationalism from primarily anti-
Japanese in nature to include its Nationalist opposi-
tion and the U.S. under the broad category of imperi-
alism. Furthermore, CCP propaganda framed the
party as the vanguard against Japanese occupation,
while the Nationalists were portrayed as preferring to
fight fellow Chinese, contributing to the enduring
anti-Japanese element within Chinese nationalism.3
Rhetoric of “liberating Taiwan” cannot be under-
stood outside of the context of the Chinese civil war.
The CCP master narrative of creating a socialist society
focused on ridding the mainland of imperialist en-
croachment and the establishment of the PRC in
1949 was constructed as the defining historical
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turning point. Since the ROC was supported by the
U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek was already labeled an
imperialist, the only means to complete the narrative
was to maintain support for military force to reclaim
the island. Thus, the CCP continued to portray the
Taiwan issue as a historical injustice, claiming both
that Taiwan for centuries had been Chinese until
Japanese annexation in 1895 and that biological and
geological evidence supported their position of the
Chineseness of Taiwan.4
An argument can be made that Taiwan was unim-
portant to the CCP until the Nationalists were forced
to the island, in part because of Mao’s comments in
the 1930s that Taiwan was beyond the boundaries of
China, in the same category as Vietnam and Korea
(Snow, 1938: 33-89).  Other CCP documents suggest
that Taiwan was seen as a peripheral entity. The
“Message to Compatriots on Resistance to Japan to
Save the Nation” and the “Resolution of the CC on
the Current Political Situation and the Party’s Tasks”
in August and December of 1935 both refer to Taiwan
in similar tones as Korea and should be united in an
anti-Japanese alliance. In the “CCP Declaration on the
War in the Pacific” in December of 1941, the CCP
states their goal of encouraging anti-Japanese propa-
ganda and agitation, again mentioning Taiwan in a
similar fashion as Korea. The Constitution of the
CCP in June of 1945 also makes no reference to the
island.
China has also assumed that any cross-strait mili-
tary conflict will include American involvement. From
the onset of the Cold War through the 1970s, the
CCP implicitly desired formal recognition from the
West. Despite constant references to the moral and
political corruptness of American “imperialism,”
Beijing realized that its security would be strengthened
by formal relations. This desire went so far that the
PRC hinted in the 1950s that it would renounce
claims to Taiwan in exchange for formal relations with
the U.S. (Madsen, 2001: 159; Purifoy, 1976: xi).
However, one can presume this option was discarded
due to its potentially negative domestic ramifications
for the CCP as much as U.S. disinterest. The impor-
tance of relations with the U.S. can also be seen in the
shift in the CCP party line. Shortly after recognition,
the PRC abandoned the slogan “liberation of Taiwan”
in favor of peaceful unification, suggesting Beijing’s
confidence that without American support, such a
policy could be successful.
America dropping its opposition to seating the
PRC, followed by the 1972 Communiqué (“The
Shanghai Communiqué”) and the 1979 Communiqué
establishing formal recognition gave Beijing officials
the impression that although unification may not be
immediate, the likelihood of permanent separation
was diminishing. American intent, however, was more
a policy of engagement and vague dialogue rather than
capitulation on Taiwan,5  with the U.S. simply
acknowledging the Chinese position of “One China.”
As Hickey stated, the term “acknowledge” was deliber-
ately chosen to indicate “cognizance of, but not
necessarily agreement with, the Chinese position.”6
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) further shattered
Chinese hopes and made American agreements on
both military supports of Taiwan (the U.S. agreed in
1972 to remove all U.S. forces from Taiwan) and
recognition of a “One China” policy seem disingenu-
ous. The TRA essentially left these relations intact,
which the PRC took as a clear violation of their
sovereignty, with later agreements and actions (e.g., the
1982 Communiqué, President Bush’s approval of
military assistance in 1992) lending further support to
American disingenuousness. With these seemingly
contradictory positions, Beijing officials surmised that
Washington opposed a Beijing-led reunification and
thus the U.S. returned as a prime obstacle in the
unification narrative. The only way to overcome this
obstacle was to raise the costs for American interven-
tion and Taiwanese actions inconsistent with unifica-
tion.
Although Chinese rhetoric about the U.S. did not
return to pre-normalization levels, their unfulfilled
expectations continue to taint Sino-American rela-
tions with a level of distrust which has only been
exacerbated by America’s support of Taiwan’s demo-
cratic reforms.
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DEMOCRATIZATION
The maintenance of China’s Taiwan policy and the
necessity of unification has aided the PRC in deflect-
ing domestic criticism, in particular the lack of demo-
cratic reforms. Beijing traditionally argued that Chi-
nese and Confucianist culture were not suited for a
Western-style democracy.
However, East Asian democratization, including
Taiwan’s own transformation, undermines this
stance.7  Taiwan’s first democratically elected president
Lee Teng-hui used this to his political advantage,
making potential reunification contingent on main-
land democratization (Shih, 2003:31).  Since then,
the CCP leadership has altered its argument, stating
that democracy brings chaos, with many drawing a
parallel to the Cultural Revolution and the potential
chaos of democratic reform, with the decline of Russia
as further evidence.
Implicit in China’s democracy-brings-chaos theory
is that foreign interests are behind such reforms to
keep the country weak by ousting the CCP. Similarly,
during the Tiananmen protests, Beijing officials drew a
direct correlation between Taiwan’s young democracy
and a looming threat to their hold on government.8
Protestors were viewed as akin to outside agitators,
making the use of force to disperse the crowds more
acceptable. While cross-strait talks emerged in 1991,
China has refused to view democratization as anything
but a potential threat.
Furthermore, the PRC leadership has attempted to
dismiss any suggestion that democratization could
alter claims over Taiwan. In practical terms, however,
it has lead to the ROC that, while still paying lip
service to “One China,” has denounced claims to the
mainland and maintained an ambiguous stance on
Taiwan’s future-consistent with a public which both
sees itself  increasingly as Taiwanese or both Chinese
and Taiwanese and that prefers the continuation of the
status quo. Any position on Taiwan’s future status
inconsistent with Taiwanese public opinion would be
political suicide. As Lee Teng-hui stated “Taiwan has
now reached the point of no return. The people of
Taiwan would never countenance any less representa-
tive form of government” (Teng-hui, 1999: 9-14).
Instead, the PRC maintains symbolic representa-
tion of Taiwan within the national legislature, enlist-
ing delegates with no connection whatsoever to the
island.9   Furthermore, accepting that Taiwan’s democ-
racy had changed its status would require Beijing to
admit that their demands for party-to-party talks
(instead of government-to-government) were inappro-
priate. On a practical level, Beijing must treat democ-
ratization as a non-issue in terms of Taiwan’s political
status or accept radical changes to the cross-strait
dialogue which does nothing to help their own goals.
Maintaining this stance seems to invite conflict
with Taiwan. It should not have been surprising then
when Lee Teng-hui set equally unacceptable conditions
for unification talks (democratic reforms on the
mainland and renouncing the use of force) (Chu,
2000: 313).  Beijing’s response, to label Lee a “lackey
of America” (Shambaugh, 1998: 242),  allowed for the
maintenance of the narrative by eliminating Lee as a
person to take seriously. It also started a pattern of
discrediting Taiwan’s leaders who refer positively to
Taiwan’s separate status as nothing more than inde-
pendence-seekers. For example, Chen Shui-bian’s
proposal of “cross-strait integration” seemed to please
PRC leaders, but once Chen clarified that this meant
rapprochement not unification, the PRC returned to a
hardline rhetoric. Although talk of “liberating” Taiwan
ceased with formal relations with the U.S., Beijing’s
efforts to maintain public support for the use of force
in order to prevent Taiwan’s permanent separation
continues. Furthermore, many Taiwanese officials have
been demonized to the point that mainland Chinese
view anyone willing to negotiate with Taiwan regarding
the island’s future status implies sovereign equality
and thus is labeled a traitor (Friedman,2001: 135).
Even cross-strait negotiations which skirt sovereignty
issues risk this backlash as any actions not clearly
consistent with unification is assumed to encourage
independence. Conciliatory efforts in the past were
often undermined by the “victor’s mentality” of old
cadres that were still in prominent positions through
the mid 1980s which were adamantly opposed to any
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conciliatory effort which implied equality for ROC
officials (Shih, 2003: 52).  Despite a marked drop in
revolutionary rhetoric out of Beijing, Taiwan’s posi-
tion in the calculus of Chinese nationalism has
remained constant. This does not mean that the PRC
has been inflexible in its Taiwan policy. Beijing seems
willing to make overtures to Taiwan as long as it
conforms to their master narrative of a CCP victorious
in the protracted Chinese civil war. Similarly, main-
land propaganda attempts to solidify the view that the
CCP is China. Any suggestion that the party was not
the true voice of China would be incongruent with
the master narrative.10 For example, in talks during the
early 1980s, the PRC seemed willing to grant Taiwan
some form of autonomy after reunification, allowing
“One China” to be defined beyond a political scope,
highlighting historical and cultural ties. Once it
became clear Taiwan did not wholeheartedly support
imminent reunification, China ended such talk and
insisted that “One China” had a clear political defini-
tion. More importantly, the CCP continues the
decade’s old notion that once Taiwan reunites with
the mainland, China will once again rise to the status
of a world power and their era of weakness will be
over. As Zong Hairen declared, “The Taiwan issue is a
threshold China must step over if it is to go out into
the world. If China fails to cross this threshold it
cannot go into the world or genuinely become a world
power; even less can it compete with the United
States” (Hairen, 2002: 16).  While unification does
provide some strategic advantages, even a peaceful
unification cannot live up to the “cure all” that Beijing
officials have made it out to be. Perpetuating this
nationalistic dream places further pressures on CCP
leaders to bring Taiwan back into the fold. Both Deng
Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin wanted unification on their
watch to secure their place in history, yet neither was
willing to take a more conciliatory approach which
would conflict with the implicit “liberation” narrative.
With the return of Hong Kong and Macao under the
“one country, two systems” formula, Jiang put added
pressure on himself because the formula made
Taiwan’s unification look inevitable (Gungwu, 2004).
While Hu Jintao has avoided an implicit timeline, he
too must show evidence that Taiwan is not forever
lost. The growing economic integration between both
sides has also done little to curb this nationalist trend,
as it, along with the PRC’s own domestic economic
growth may actually strengthen Chinese nationalist
sentiment as it reinforces that China is on its way to
economic and political superpower status. As Lam
suggests, the next generation of Chinese leaders,
equipped with greater economic power, have little
reason to decrease their nationalist tone (Lam, 2003:
264-265).  A PRC on the rise then may be more
inclined to push the Taiwanissue.11
By encouraging such nationalist sentiment and
being unable to deliver, Beijing officials have produced
an unintended side effect. Since the government relies
so heavily on nationalism, reining in public variants is
particularly problematic (Zhang, 2007: 27-30). Nation-
alism by its very nature plays upon history, but if the
nationalistic message is unattainable, these unfulfilled
national desires impose higher pressures for the future.
Shih argues that if enough unfulfilled nationalism
accumulates within a society, these grievances will lead
to complete devotion to further nationalist causes
(Shih, 2003: 81). In other words, Beijing’s nationalist
rhetoric has created a spiraling effect, encouraging
greater support of the party line in regards to Taiwan
policy, but also placing greater demands on the
government to conform to this hardline approach
when a more conciliatory policy may be more effective
in achieving the mainland’s goals.
Viewing Chinese nationalism as a response to
legitimate concerns over territorial integrity is also
misleading. The PRC has continuously used the
principle of preserving territorial integrity in its
argument over Taiwan (Hsiao, 1998: 715). With the
return of Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan remains the
last major territory claimed by the PRC not under its
control, the last remnant of China’s humiliating
defeats in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, the
CCP not only accepted the loss of land before “los-
ing” Taiwan to the Nationalists (i.e., Outer Mongolia),
they have also willingly relinquished other territorial
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claims in recent years.12 Since Taiwan was never under
control of the CCP or PRC, it also differs from the
traditional view of a separatist movement. The PRC
did not lose control of Taiwan; they never had it.
Furthermore, Taiwan cannot be seen as a threat to
Chinese security unless backed heavily by the U.S.13
Attempting to explain China’s Taiwan policy as
primarily a function of nationalism admittedly over-
simplifies the situation. A common argument is that
the mainland’s fear of looking weak on Taiwan prohib-
its any negotiations on the matter and that the CCP
leadership would lose all credibility if it is weak on the
Taiwan issue. The core of this argument is that if
Taiwan were to reject conciliatory offers from the
mainland, the PRC would lose face. A mishandling of
the issue could also strain the power coalition within
the CCP, a major concern during the Jiang-Zhu era
(Wang and Yongnian, 2000: 7), but a concern which
persists today. However, several incidents have made
the PRC’s stance look weak and yet the legitimacy of
the leadership was not inquestion. The mainland’s
backing down during the Quemoy and Matsu crisis
1954–1955, the enactment of the Taiwan Relations
Act, and America’s increased military sales after the
1982 Communiqué all contradicted the notion that
Chinese nationalism would require a hardline re-
sponse. In each case, the mainland response was
limited primarily to harsh criticism, suggesting that
the PRC is maintaining the policy of being “firm on
principles, flexible on tactics.” A key difference,
however, is that in all of the cases mentioned, Taiwan
was not the party that made China look weak. Rather
it was America’s influence. In the aftermath of democ-
ratization, Taiwan’s success as a separate entity presents
a continued challenge to the PRC narrative, one
arguably more detrimental to the PRC’s master
narrative than previous incidents. This is exacerbated
by the need for Taiwanese officials to maintain domes-
tic support on matters which can upset the delicate
balance of cross-strait dialogue. Taiwan’s military
purchases from the U.S. under the Ma Ying-jeou
administration for example directly conflicted with
the government’s more pro-China stance, leading the
PRC to respond with traditional harsh rhetoric
common during the previous Chen Shui-bian adminis-
tration. Beijing’s ultimate objectives for Taiwan also
remain somewhat unclear. The PRC certainly wants
unification, but, outside of the proposed “One China,
Two Systems” formula, has been vague on the struc-
ture of this unified China. The mixed success of Hong
Kong under this system has done little to entice
Taiwan to move towards unification, suggesting that
another formula may be more appropriate. However,
the PRC calls other formulas unacceptable (e.g.,
federalism), thus denying the possibility of a formula
that allows for the basic continuation of Taiwan’s de
facto independence while committing both sides to
unification. Pushing for a hasty unification, however,
brings greater problems for Beijing. Any large scale
military action to retake Taiwan would conflict with
mainland propaganda, revealing that the Taiwanese
public was not on the side of the PRC.14 Even if the
PLA can quickly overcome forces on the island and
cross-strait conflict does not encourage protests in
Tibet and Xinjiang dividing People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) attention, reincorporating a defeated Taiwan
into a greater China will be politically and economi-
cally exhaustive. The only clear objective behind
military threats or even more recent enticements, thus
is to maintain hope for unification by preventing
formal independence (Swaine, 2004: 40).
THE CONTENDING EPISODE
Historically, the CCP has used force (or the threat
of it) to test an opponent’s resolve and the Taiwan
issue is no different. The first major test occurred over
Matsu and Quemoy in 1954–1955 which arguably
backfired, resulting in greater American support for
the ROC and a weak threat to use nuclear weapons to
stop Chinese aggression. In 1954 America lifted its
blockade of Taiwan, making a more ambitious attempt
to reclaim the mainland possible. Chiang Kai-shek
amassed large numbers of troops on the offshore
islands leading up to the crisis, which perhaps con-
vinced the CCP a heightened conflict was imminent.15
Others suggest that following the Korean War, the
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PRC’s primary motive was to test the strength of
America’s renewedcommitments to the ROC
(Kovachi, 2002: 7; Copper, 2003: 48).
Regardless of the cause, this show of force accom-
plished two things for the CCP. First, it reinforced the
view of American intent on containment and made
possible the symbolic use of Taiwan to drum up anti-
American sentiment for China’s continued humilia-
tion. Second, it encouraged the ROC to maintain the
offshore islands. Chiang Kai-shek saw the islands as a
symbolic link to the mainland and his claims to
legitimately rule it. To relinquish them after this
military conflict would not only signal to the CCP
military weakness, but would likely encourage those
within Taiwan to consider Taiwan as a separate coun-
try, a consideration dismissed post 1954.
With Sino-American rapprochement in 1979, the
PRC ended talk of the need to “liberate” Taiwan in
favor of allowing for peaceful reunification. However,
as Taiwan’s democratized, China’s willingness to
remind Taiwan that forceful reunification was still an
option became more common. While China’s threats
have changed little, its capabilities to fulfill such
threats have grown. The combination of Chinese
nationalism and a belief that war may be inevitable
leads Beijing to continue its hardline approach. To
increase its deterrence capabilities, China has spent an
exorbitant amount on weaponry, reducing, if not
eliminating any technological advantages possessed by
Taiwan. Recent acquisitions have led some PLA
officials to believe that within the next decade, the
PRC will not only have military superiority over
Taiwan, but will be able to repel “foreign interven-
tion” as well. Taiwan has responded with attempts to
improve its deterrent capabilities. While the PLA’s
projection is unlikely, the rapid military advances are a
cause for concern.
Military improvements have created a chauvinistic
mentality that China can act more unilaterally con-
cerning Taiwan than before. Beijing believes that this
will make the U.S. less likely to support Taiwan,
turning the ROC from “bold and aggressive” to
“demoralized and cautious” (Garver, 1997: 13).
Although the PLA’s capabilities have increased consid-
erably in recent years, the focus of military develop-
ment remains rather limited. Much of the effort has
been on missile development and cyber-war capabili-
ties, not equipment needed for an invasion, which
suggests that Beijing’s motive remains deterrence. This
also shows the limitations of Chinese military threats
to others in the region. The PRC may be looking for a
rationale for war, but their military build-up heavily
favors deterrence or short-term conflict, not a full
invasion.
Even assuming that China’s military build-up is
intended solely for deterrence purposes, this does little
to decrease tension in the region. China has never
clearly defined what it would take for a military
response and now with greater abilities to inflict
damage on Taiwan, China may lower this threshold.
For example, the Anti-Secession Law of 2005 appears
to label any move that may appear as directed towards
independence or Taiwan’s unwillingness to unify as a
potential cause for military action.16
Secondly, Taiwan feels inherently less secure
because of this build-up and thus seeks more military
procurements and greater protection from the U.S.
More generally, China’s military build-up and the
militant Chinese nationalism supporting it encourages
Taiwanese to see themselves as different than Chinese
on the mainland.17 This arguably creates a spiraling
effect as Taiwan’s efforts to assert themselves increase
the mainland’s belief that Taiwan is creeping towards
independence. The mainland thus takes a harder
stance and increases its missiles directed at Taiwan,
further encouraging Taiwanese to see themselves as
different from those on the mainland.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of Communist ideology, national-
ism has become the primary means to unify a popula-
tion into accepting, if not approving, the continued
leadership of the CCP. This tool, however, has no
clear long-range objective other than unification and
thus one cannot easily predict what role Chinese
nationalism will play in the future. As Scalapino
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stated, as China becomes a greater political power, this
nationalism could manifest itself in either benign (e.g.,
a focus on a rich cultural heritages) or militant form
(Scalapino, 1998: 204). Presently, the PRC’s national-
ist narrative requiring unification precludes the
possibility of a negotiated political settlement regard-
ing Taiwan’s sovereignty, even one that ultimately
leads to unification. The negative rhetoric towards
previous Taiwanese presidents simply increased sup-
port for these men in a way that a cordial approach
never could, by creating a clear “us and them” image
Taiwanese politicians could play upon. The
mainland’s decision to continue a hardline approach
in 2000 likely lead to their least desired candidate
being elected (pro-independence candidate Chen Shui-
bian), leaving Beijing officials confused at their lack of
success (Wang, 2001: 726). This may in part explain
not only China’s more flexible policy since the
election of Ma Ying-jiu in Taiwan, but President Ma’s
own pro-China policy initiatives.
Beijing has been given ample opportunities to make
overtures to the ROC short of acknowledging them as
a legitimate national government. Recent party-to-
party talks and increased commercial ties show that
constructive dialogue, however flawed, may be pos-
sible. The culmination of the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA) and the possibility of
an emerging “Chaiwan” economic union suggest a
major thaw in cross-strait dialogue and may encourage
both sides to conduct constructive dialogues on
sovereignty issues. China’s rise as a world power in
part requires peaceful regional economic if not politi-
cal integration, Taiwan included. While some expect
economic integration to encourage political solutions
(Cheung, 2010: 11-36), such hopeful thinking, how-
ever, ignores the continued attempts by the PRC to at
least rhetorically separate economic and political
spheres. Even the means in which ECFA was negoti-
ated intentionally resembled party-to-party talks rather
than intergovernmental negotiations, further dismiss-
ing the dynamics of a democratic Taiwan (Cohen,
Jerome A. and Chen, 2010).  Furthermore, greater
economic integration may leave Taiwan sensing fewer
political options.
While China attempts to keep economic and
political discussions separate, consistent with official
nationalism, in practice this has been problematic, not
only in terms of concerns within Taiwan but the
expectations within China that economic integrations
is simply an intermediary stage before political integra-
tion. Although increased economic integration may
create greater pressures for both sides to find accept-
able political solutions to the Taiwan issue, little
evidence suggests that China’s stance vis-à-vis Taiwan’s
sovereignty will change.
In contrast to ever more sophisticated approaches
to international relations elsewhere, China’s Taiwan
policy remains poorly developed for current condi-
tions (Hickey, 2009: 31-70). Despite recent thaws in
cross-strait relations and the PRC’s own belief that
time is on their side, the dismissal of Taiwan’s democ-
racy confounds the mainland’s goals as it has allowed a
counter nationalism to foster. Such backlash is appar-
ent in Taiwan as the perceived economic benefits from
recent cross-strait exchanges have not overcome
sovereignty concerns. China may believe that their
increased economic and political power will propel
them to superpower status and in the process Taiwan
will be forced back into the fold, but the interplay of
Taiwan’s democratization and the counter nationalism
encouraged indirectly by Beijing’s own actions make
this highly doubtful.
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1 Zhou Enlai had mentioned the possibility of peaceful “liberation” in
1956, but the term was generally seen to imply eventual unification
by force (Guillermaz, 1976: 181).
2 Zhao argues that Chinese nationalism was sparked by foreign
invasions (Zhao, 2000: 253; Shih, 2003: 84).
3 This narrative endured even though the KMT played a far more
instrumental role in this than their communist counterparts. KMT
contributions to liberation were largely ignored until 2005 (Chang
and Halliday, 2005: 211-213; Chan and Bridges, 2006: 135).
4 This evidence intentionally omits contrary evidence. First, that
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples do not have a Chinese mainland origin.
Secondly, even if geological evidence shows a historical linkage
between Taiwan and China, this predates the Chinese state.
5 This could also be inferred by the broadness of the 1972
Communiqué, in that both sides mention the general need to
reduce tensions and increase peace in Asia, discussing Korea, India-
83
Pakistan conflict and Indochina almost as much and in similar vague
terms as the Taiwan issue. Guillermaz referred to this as both sides
making a “tentative sketch of what East Asia could become.”
Guillermaz 1976: 549; “Nixon’s China Game,” documentary,
WGBH Educational Foundation and Ambrica Productions, 2000.
6 Similarly the PRC made similar “acknowledgements” of continued
American arms sales to Taiwan to quicken the normalisation
process. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “U.S.-Taiwan Security Ties:
Toward the Next Millennium” (paper presented at the conference
Taiwan on the Threshold of the 21st Century: A Paradigm
Reexamined, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. 4-5
January, 1999), available online at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/IS/
IS-Hickey.htm.
7 Democratic reforms in pre-1997 Hong Kong further damage such
claims.
8 Although Taiwanese may have emotionally supported the
Tiananmen demonstrators, there is no evidence that the ROC
supported protestors with money or material (Copper, 2003: 54-
55.
9 The ROC would also likely prevent would-be delegates from Taiwan
from filling these seats as well as this would be explicitly acknowl-
edging the PRC’s conception of “one country, two systems.”
“China’s Mystery Delegates a Puzzle to Most Taiwanese,” Taipei
Times, 1 March, 2003.
10 David Shambaugh, “Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or
National Army?” in Bringing the Party Back in: How China is
Governed, ed. Kjeld Erik Brosgaard and Zheng Yongnian (National
University of Singapore, 2004), 24.
11 An aide to Jiang Zemin stated, “The Taiwan problem will automati-
cally be solved once China is recognised around the world as on par
with the U.S. Can you imagine any country daring to sell arms to
Hawaii if there was a pro-independence movement on the island?”;
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Jiang pulls out all the stops in foreign policy,”
South China Morning Post, 25 January, 1999, http://
special.scmp.com/chinaat50/Article/FullText_asp_ArticleID-
19990928210012708.html.
12 Since 1991, China has settled border conflicts with six nations and
in most received half or less of the contested territory. In its
agreement with Tajikistan, China conceded to only 1,000 of the
28,000 square miles of territory in dispute (Medeiros and Fravel,
2003).
13 While bombing the Three Gorges Dam has been suggested as a
means to deter China, there is no evidence that Taiwan has
considered a pre-emptive strike. “No Plan to Attack Three Gorges
Dam: MND,” China Post, June 10, 2004; “China General Threatens
War if Taiwan Targets Three Gorges,” China Post, June 17, 2004;
“Terrorism Part on Taiwan Separatist Agenda,” Xinhua News
Agency, 18 June, 2004; Peter H. Gleick, “Three Gorges Dam
Project, Yangtze River, China,” Water Brief 3, The World’s Water
2008–2009 (2008): 139–150; Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Continues
Cruise Missile Effort,” DefenseNews, 23 March, 2009
14 The call to “liberate” Taiwan and references to Taiwanese compatri-
ots always suggested that the majority of the island’s inhabitants
were supportive of the PRC. The implication is that the ROC
government and other “imperialist” or independence minded
Taiwanese were the source of the conflict.
15 This does not necessarily mean either side expected the ROC to
attempt to recapture the mainland, onlythat backed by the U.S.
the Nationalists could take more provocative actions against the
mainland.
16 Article 8 states that “In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’
secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to
cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major
incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or
that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely
exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other
necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity.” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United
States of America website, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/
twwt/t187406.htm.
17 For more on the rise of Taiwanese identity and its relation with the
island’s future status vis-à-vis China, see Election Study Center
(National Chengchi University) “Taiwanese/Chinese Identification
Trend Distribution in Taiwan (1992/06–2009/12),” available online at
http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/
TaiwanChineseID.htm; (Niou, 2005: 91-104).
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